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The logic of interest, which has gained considerable ground in foreign policy
formulation in Turkey, is not rooted in Western identity, nor is it contingent upon the degree
of interaction exclusively with the Western world. The entire world has equal prominence in
Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. Whether the prevalence of the logic of interest in the
formulation of Turkish foreign policy under the “post-Islamist” AKP government signifies a
deviation from the Westernization process or whether it is simply a reaction to the conjunc-
tural developments in the international arena in order to preserve Turkey’s national interests
is seriously debated. This paper aims to contribute to this debate by shedding light on the




History and geography affect the foreign policies of states, as does type of political
regime, ideological disposition, national threat perception, alliance commitment,
and economic need. However, these are more variable and less durable factors when
compared to history and geography, the impact of which may be far greater and
longer-term. History and geography may have had an even greater impact on the
formulation of Turkish foreign policy because of the highly strategic geographical
location of Turkey and its much-cherished history as the heir of the Ottoman
Empire.
The modern Republic of Turkey was founded on October 29, 1923, out of the
ashes of the Ottoman Empire following the War of Liberation against the occupying




 The fundamental principles
of the foreign policy of the new Republic were laid out by Atatürk as its founder and
first president. Atatürk’s objective was to elevate Turkey to the rank of highly civi-
lized nations, which were at that time mostly found in the West. Therefore, the term
“Westernization” has been used for decades to denote the fundamental orientation
of Turkey in its foreign relations.
The Westernization process was primarily conceived as a way to contribute to the
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mentality becomes evident when one considers the fact that the Ottoman Empire had
already launched a reformation and restructuring process with the Tanzimat move-
ment in the early nineteenth century, when it was militarily and economically




In the early 1920s, in accordance with the goal of elevating the young Turkish
Republic to the rank of highly civilized nations in the world, Atatürk set into
motion comprehensive reforms that were perfectly compatible with the goal of
Westernization. These reforms, however, were so radical and intensive that they
shook the foundations of traditional Ottoman/Turkish society and injected a strong
ideational soul to the initially fear-driven Westernization process. Since then, the
assertion of a Western identity has greatly affected the logic of Turkish foreign
policy formulation.
A clear-cut example of this was Turkey’s eagerness to become a member of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which occurred in 1952. Turkey did
not mind that the Middle East was considered “out-of-area” in the contingency plan-
ning of its military alliance. Bitter memories of World War I, during which the Arab
communities under Ottoman rule collaborated with Great Britain and France (who
partitioned the imperial territories), have left deep traces in the mindset of most
Turks. The net effect of this development was the total denial of Middle Eastern poli-
tics by the young Turkish Republic and an effort to dissociate itself from the region
for as long as it could. Similarly, Turkey’s endeavors to become an associate or full
member in European institutions—the European Union in particular—since the early
1960s, indicates its fascination with being treated as European in the international
arena. Against this background it would be safe to say that the “logic of identity” has
dominated foreign policy in the Republic of Turkey since its foundation.
Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War, and more so in the new millennium,
interest-based calculations have gained considerable ground in the logic of foreign
policy formulation in Turkey. Yet, this “logic of interest” is not contingent upon the
degree of interaction exclusively with the Western world. The entire world, includ-
ing the Middle East, now has equal prominence in Turkey’s foreign policy orienta-
tion. Globalization and the rapidly changing international environment may have
been powerful factors in widening the scope of Turkey’s foreign policy agenda.
However, a number of significant developments in the political and economic
realms in Turkey, culminating in the rise of the Justice and Development Party
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in the November 2002 general elections, have




Whether the prevalence of the logic of interest in the formulation of Turkish





deviation from the fundamental principles presented by Atatürk in the 1920s (such
as Westernization) or whether it is simply a reaction to the conjunctural develop-
ments in the international arena in order to preserve Turkey’s national interests, is a
seriously debated issue in the country. Hence, this paper contributes to this debate
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This paper begins with brief descriptions of the logic of fear, the logic of identity,
and the logic of interest, which were significant ideas in the formulation of Turkish
foreign policy. Then it proceeds with a discussion on how and why the foreign
policy behaviors of the Western nations towards Turkey affected the logic that
prevailed in different periods. More emphasis is placed on relations between Turkey
and Western Europe because of the longer history of these relations and their
geographical proximity. However, the impact of relations with the United States on
the formulation of Turkey’s foreign policy is also included in the scope of this paper
because the role of security considerations and, therefore, the role that the Turkish
military played in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy cannot be overlooked or
underestimated.
The paper then offers an analysis of the factors that paved the way to the domi-
nance of the logic of interest. The impact of developments that have taken place in
the political, economic, and military spheres, both inside and outside of Turkey, that
are thought to be responsible for such an outcome are thus elaborated in detail.
The paper concludes by addressing the challenges that even the logic of interest
has been confronting since the beginning of the twenty-first century, primarily due
to the attitude of the West—the European Union and the United States combined—
and by arguing that unless the West seriously considers these challenges, they are
likely to cause a profound deviation from the traditional orientation of Turkish
foreign policy, which may, in turn, have repercussions for the West.
 
Turkey’s Approach to the West: Alternative Logics at Play
 
From a conceptual perspective one can explain Turkey’s approach to the West in
general and its adoption of the EU’s norms in particular from three alternative
logics, namely the logic of fear, the logic of identity, and the logic of interest.
 
The Logic of Fear
 
The logic of fear suggests that Turkey strives to become a member of the West out
of security-related concerns. These concerns are twofold: to avoid the possibility
that the West would define Turkey as a potential threat and thus interfere with its
internal affairs, and to seek help from the West against other external threats. Based
on Ottoman-era experiences, the founding fathers of the Turkish Republic
concluded that eliminating the fears of exclusion, dismemberment, and encircle-
ment would be possible through the implementation of Western-oriented reforms at





 Arising from the logic of fear, joining the European international society
as a legitimate power was crucial for Turkey in order to avoid the real danger of
being threatened by Europe. The implication of this union for domestic politics was
that forming a unitary and homogenous nation-state at home was necessary in order
to avoid external interference in Turkey’s internal affairs because, in the past, the
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manipulate the decisions of the Porte (the Istanbul government) and to impose their
own visions.
 
The Logic of Identity
 
The logic of identity suggests that the transformation of Turkey’s identity in line
with the constitutive norms of the West is considered legitimate at home and that
Turkey would willingly pay the costs of harmonization with the West. The early
modernization attempts during the 1920s were undertaken with a view to accelerat-
ing Turkey’s transformation into a Western-style secular nation-state, where not
only state and religion would be institutionally separated from each other (objective
secularization) but also where people would gradually view religion as a private




 As it was believed
that modernization would lead to migration from rural to urban areas, growing liter-
acy rates, ongoing industrialization, and the abolition of feudal societal relations, the
public role of Islam would be limited. Through modernization would come the
increased ability of the center to help shape society from above and to create a
community of citizens out of a community of Muslim people who were the subjects
of the Ottoman Sultan. Ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences would gradually
lose value in shaping peoples’ identities. Pursuing ethnicity politics would be seen as
illegitimate, as the principle of constitutional-territorial citizenship would define the
boundaries of national identity. The degree of Turkey’s socialization into Western
norms would be highest if Turkey approached the West from a logic of identity.
 
The Logic of Interest
 
The logic of interest suggests that Turkey adopts the constitutive norms of the West
to the extent that they help Turkey to achieve its pre-determined national interests. If
the benefits of socialization into Western norms exceeded the costs, this process
would continue. The more Turkey is believed to benefit from the continuation of the
Westernization/Europeanization process the longer it would be willing to pay the
costs of becoming a Western/European country.
 
The Logic of the Western/European Approach towards Turkey
 
Concepts of the logic of identity and the logic of interest can also be used to explain
the West’s attitude towards Turkey. The logic of identity adopted in the Western
world has indeed two versions, one of which simply suggests that a country cannot
become a legitimate member of the West unless it is perceived to share the
unchangeable constitutive aspects of Western identity. Proponents of this logic,
therefore, argue that there is no way for Turkey to join the EU, as Turkey is not
Christian, does not share Europe’s Greco-Roman cultural and historical heritage, and
is not geographically located on the European continent. The second version of the































Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace?
 
581
cultural project and that the EU’s identity should rely on universal principles of liber-
alism, democracy, respect for human rights, and constitutionalism. To these propo-
nents, Turkey’s membership in the EU could materialize if and when Turkey adheres




obstacles in front of Turkey to internalize them. Proponents of the logic of interest in
the West suggest that Turkey’s membership in the EU should be contingent on the
sum of the costs and benefits of such an action. If the benefits of Turkey’s inclusion
exceed the benefits of its exclusion, particularly measured in terms of economic,
political, and military considerations, the EU should let Turkey in.
During the Cold War era, both logics could have justified Turkey’s standing in
Western institutions for two main reasons. First, Western identity was mainly defined
with respect to opposition to the East, namely the communist bloc led by the Soviet
Union. As such, Turkey’s Western identity was not contested, thanks to its member-
ship in NATO. Second, Turkey’s membership in NATO served the interest of the
West, particularly in its efforts to contain Soviet expansionism towards Western
Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East.
Nevertheless, the dynamics of the relationship between Turkey and the EU in the
post-Cold War era have proved unsatisfactory in terms of identity-related consider-
ations. Turkey’s recognition as a Western or a European country has become diffi-
cult, as the Central and Eastern European countries appear to be truly European
when compared to Turkey in terms of the fundamental aspects of Western/European
identity. Furthermore, Turkey’s growing troubles with liberal democracy and the
protection of human rights at home tied the hands of those who might have fought
for Turkey’s inclusion in the EU based on its cosmopolitan, universal norms.
In addition, justifying Turkey’s inclusion in the EU in terms of interest-related
considerations has become difficult, if not impossible. Many Europeans question
Turkey’s relevance to Europe’s security in the absence of the colossal Soviet threat.
Turkey has increasingly been seen as an ally that could potentially contribute to
Western security within the context of Middle Eastern politics. However, the more
Turkey’s relevance to the West emanates from its Middle Eastern connections, the
more its European identity has become contested. Not only has Turkey’s perfor-
mance in meeting the EU accession criteria become the most important element
defining the legitimacy of Turkey’s European identity; the idea that Turkey’s secu-




The perception of Turkey as a buffer zone between Europe and the unstable





idea, coupled with the EU’s growing focus on the Central and Eastern European





 While the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe
were offered credible chances for inclusion in the EU, Turkey was informally
thought to be satisfied with a privileged status. The Luxembourg decisions in
December 1997, stating that Turkey was not eligible for membership, demonstrated
growing reluctance in EU circles to include Turkey. Even the confirmation of
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not radically improve Turkey’s status; the EU tied Turkey’s eventual accession to




, the EU’s absorption capacity and the affirma-
tive votes of European nationals. Besides, the EU made it clear that accession nego-





Moreover, the EU’s approach towards Turkey has not changed for the better in
the wake of the September 11 attacks and the US-led war in Iraq. Paradoxically,
since the EU started accession talks in late 2005, voices against Turkey’s inclusion




The EU’s decision to start accession talks with Turkey was mainly informed by
interest-related considerations. As EU members debated among themselves about the
appropriateness of such a decision, the overwhelming view in the EU capitals was
that both Turkey and the EU would undergo significant changes by the time Turkey
joined the EU. Given that the eventual accession would not take place until the 2020s,
shutting the door in Turkey’s face now would not be a rational action. By the time
accession actually happened, both the EU’s absorption capacity would increase and
the degree of Turkey’s internal and external Europeanization would be strengthened.
Despite the fact that the start of accession talks institutionally brought Turkey
closer to the EU, the optimistic mood among the Turks and the Europeans has taken
a negative turn. Suspicions of Turkey’s unsuitability for membership have grown.
European public opinion has also been growing wary of the presence of the Muslim
community in the EU. It is almost certain that if the question of Turkey’s eventual
accession were put to public referenda, overwhelming majorities in countries such




In the post-September 11 period, objections to Turkey’s membership on the basis
of identity-related considerations have increased while the arguments in favor of
Turkish accession on the basis of cost-benefit calculations have lost ground. With
the rise of “Islamophobic” sentiments across the European continent, coupled with
growing societal security concerns over the existence of approximately 20 million
Muslims, the EU has increasingly become reluctant to develop a strong geopolitical





circles that traditionally advocated Turkey’s inclusion on the basis of the EU’s
multicultural and secular identity have also lost some weight, given Turkey’s
democratization performance, which has fluctuated since 2006.
On the other hand, the EU has begun to view the “war on terror” strategy, launched
by the United States in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, as more harmful
than beneficial for the security of Europe. Such a view may be another reason why





 The risk here is that if EU officials adopt the view that the best strategy to
avoid the dangers of transnational terrorism would be to play “the deaf and
the blind,” the EU’s commitments to Middle Eastern stability might decrease.
Disengagement of the EU from the Middle East would potentially put Turkey in
limbo regarding its European aspirations as it would reduce the prospects of
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Given that one of the significant ways for Turkey to register its European identity
would pass through its attempts to demonstrate its relevance to European security
within the Middle Eastern context, the EU’s disengagement from the Middle East
would render Turkey’s potential contributions meaningless. Unlike the EU,
Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East has deepened, as Turkey’s internal secu-
rity depends on what happens in the region. The worry here is that the growing
salience of the Middle East in Turkish foreign policy might prompt the Europeans to
believe that Turkey is more a Middle Eastern country than a European one.
 
Role of US Policies in Diluting Turkey’s Claims for Western/European Identity
 
Similar to the developments on the European front, Turkey has also grown discon-
tent with the changing dynamics of its relationship with the United States and
NATO in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Ankara and
Washington have searched for new grounds on which to continue their alliance rela-
tionship. The transformation of NATO from a trans-Atlantic/Western collective
defense organization into a semi-political, semi-military global collective security
organization has rendered Turkey’s efforts to claim its Western/European identity—
thanks to her alliance membership—more difficult than ever. Rather, Turkey’s
membership in NATO seems to be based more on the understanding that Turkey is a
Middle Eastern country whose primary role is to help the West project its values




Whereas the United States would have liked to rely on Turkey’s geopolitical and
military assets in the Greater Middle Eastern region, in the post-Cold War era





 Otherwise, Turkey’s potential contributions to US/NATO interests
in the Greater Middle Eastern region might have mistakenly led observers to
conclude that Turkey was simply a Middle Eastern country and not a European one.
Such Turkish concerns became noticeable when the United States asked Turkey to
let the Americans use NATO’s capabilities in out-of-area missions. Such requests
created enormous pressure on Turkey because Turkey’s permission would suggest





Developments in the post-September 11 era have also underlined the Middle
Eastern aspects of Turkey’s identity among Western powers. For instance, Turkey
was considered to be a “model” for the moderate Islamic regimes in the Middle East
that lived in harmony with the Western powers. Moreover, there was a constitutive
relationship between the quality of security in the West and the quality of gover-




 Hence the promotion of liberal democracies and
good governance in the Middle East was thought to be necessary for the security
strategy of the West.
Notwithstanding the expectation of Europeans and Americans of Turkey in
regard to its capacity to offer a model for the states in the Greater Middle Eastern
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such an argument was seen by Turks to further erode the credentials of Turkey’s
Western/European identity. The more the suggestion that Turkey offers a successful
example of the peaceful cohabitation between Islam and democracy, the more
concerned Turkey’s secular elites felt. To these elites, Turkey is first and foremost a
secular state in which Islam can in no way be mentioned in defining the state’s iden-
tity. The American claim that Islam and democracy can coexist suggests that Islam
is a social force shaping people’s identity. Seen from this perspective, the legitimacy
of the ideational logic towards the West, particularly on the part of Turkey’s




 The more the West sees
Turkey’s transformation into a moderate Islamic country as being in its security





Turkey Embraces the Logic of Interest in its Foreign Relations
 
Due to the ambiguous attitude of the EU towards Turkey, the makers of Turkish
foreign policy apparently doubted that the EU’s goal was to keep Turkey in its orbit
forever without offering prospects for full membership. Thus, the prime motivation
behind relations with the EU has become to secure Turkey’s national interest,




 One particular reason
for such an outcome has been Turkey’s concern—and the perceived reluctance of
the West throughout the 1990s—to accelerate integration into the EU. Hence, the
adoption of the logic of interest towards the EU over the logic of identity or the logic
of fear can be seen as a reaction of the Turks to the slow-motion integration strategy,
in the minds of the Europeans.
The changes that Turkey went through the 1990s constitute another factor that
may have caused the adoption of the logic of interest towards the West. In those
years, new, popular social classes began to replace older ones as the center of
economic activity gradually shifted from Istanbul to Anatolia. Growing economic
power on the part of the Anatolian bourgeoisie resulted in demands for the redistri-
bution of political privileges. As they became economically more powerful these




 The more representation they
acquired the more they tried to change the substance of Turkish foreign policy inter-
ests to their own image. Turkey’s growing integration into the global markets has
resulted in the formation of a new understanding, according to which Turkey should
take utmost care to contribute to achieving peaceful and stable relations in its
region. Regional instability would delay Turkey’s economic development and
stymie the country’s efforts to integrate successfully into the global economy.
Uninterrupted economic growth at home increasingly required the emergence of
stable and peaceful regions in Turkey’s neighborhood. In this sense, Turkey’s
efforts to contribute to the emergence of regional stability in the Middle East, partic-
ularly in the post–September 11 era, by playing a facilitator role and acting as a
European country in non-European geographies contributing to regional integration
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 Moreover, the more economy oriented Turkish
foreign policy has become, the more legitimate has Eurasian identity been seen in
Turkey. The hope was that Turkey’s capability to materialize its economic develop-
ment at home as well as to reach out to its neighborhood would become much easier
if Turkey defined itself as a Eurasian country rather than as one whose number one




 The emergence of Turkey’s Eurasian
identity, coupled with a pragmatic approach towards the West, has been affected by
a series of domestic developments.
First, with growing liberal democracy at home, civilians and elected politicians
have increasingly become more important than appointed bureaucrats (particularly
those in the military and diplomatic circles) in the formulation of Turkey’s foreign
and security policies. The more the civilians have gained ground, the more Turkey’s
adoption of an ambitious foreign policy has become observable. Despite the military
establishment’s inclination to preserve the status quo and to counsel caution, civil-
ians have tended to adopt more daring ideology-driven attitudes to situations
abroad. In other words, while the military has tried to preserve Turkey’s gains, civil-




Second, as the liberal democratization process continued, interest groups vied to
influence Turkish foreign policy in accordance with their particular interests and
ideologies. The growing salience of societal input has caused a multidimensional
Turkish foreign policy. The most important ideological stance that has shaped the
emerging foreign policy consensus is that Turkey is a regional actor in its own right
and should define its interests, independent of its institutional links to the Western
international community. Rather than looking outside through the prisms of the West,
this new stance suggests that Turkey should make use of its links to the West in pursu-
ing its interests abroad. Instead of trying to prove its value to the West by contributing
to the materialization of Western security interests in its neighborhood, the prevailing
view was that Turkey should adopt an instrumental approach towards the West. In
other words, the Westernization/Europeanization process should continue so long as
the links to the West enhance Turkey’s capability for projecting its power.
A third factor that caused the adoption of the logic of interest towards the West
was the victories of the AKP in the parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2007. The
AKP government has begun to view the EU accession process from an instrumental
perspective in the sense that the value of this process has increasingly depended on
its relevance to the materialization of Turkey’s economic interests abroad. This fact
becomes evident if one takes into account the AKP government’s argument that the
EU accession process contributes to the improvement of Turkey’s domestic stability
and leads rich foreign investors from Western and Gulf countries to come and invest




 The institutional identity of the AKP has made the adop-
tion of the logic of interest much easier. Despite the fact that the AKP does not share
the EU-skeptic approach of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), which used to say
that “the EU is a Christian club and Turkey should not join it if it wants to preserve
its Islamic identity,” the AKP leadership does not believe that Western/European
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It is worth mentioning in this regard that the AKP considers Turkey to belong
both to European and Islamic civilizations. Participating in the “Alliance of
Civilization” initiative under the aegis of the United Nations fully fits into this
mentality. Instead of first adopting the EU’s norms and identity and then acting as
the representative of the EU in the Middle East, the AKP appears to think that
Turkey should rather represent the Islamic civilizations within the EU. Just as the
start of the accession process with the EU helped improve Turkey’s soft-power
standing in the eyes of Islamic nations, the AKP leadership also believes that
Turkey’s growing security, and cultural and economic links with the Middle East
will increase the prospects of that country’s accession to the EU.
Equally significant is that the AKP differentiates between the continuation of the
accession process with the EU and membership itself. That it pays more attention to
the former recently became obvious when the AKP leadership announced: “Turkey
would continue to undertake the liberal-democratic reforms even if the EU




 Comparing the reactions of the government
of Mesut Yılmaz (then the leader of the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi,
ANAP)) to the EU decision (taken at the Luxembourg Summit meeting in December
1997) to exclude Turkey from the enlargement rounds, the AKP’s reaction to the EU
decision in December 2006 to partially suspend the accession talks over eight
specific chapters was as mild as one could imagine. This attitude is a reflection of the
logic of interest adopted in formulating Turkey’s foreign policy.
 
The Logic of Interest Challenged
 
As the incompatibilities between Turkey and the West become more apparent, even
the logic of interest, which prevailed in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy




First, as the internalization of the EU’s Copenhagen criteria appeared to be the
main decisive factor for Turkey’s inclusion in the West, fear that Turkey would
transform into a multicultural, decentralized, and federal polity increased at home.
The EU’s request that Turkey define the Kurdish and the Alevite (non-Sunni
Muslim) citizens of Turkey as minority groups who were eligible for positive
discrimination caused anxiety among both the Kemalist elite and AKP government
circles. The growing demand from the West that Turkey find a political solution to
the Kurdish problem at home provided justification for the erosion of the logic of
interest. Such calls appear to overlook the fact that the resolution of PKK (Kurdistan
Workers’ Party) terrorism is not possible without accounting for what has been
happening in northern Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
The US-led war in Iraq has made it crystal clear that the developments in the region
seriously affect Turkey’s internal security complex, mainly because Kurds in
Turkey might be increasingly attracted to the emerging Kurdish nationalism in
northern Iraq. It is worth mentioning that the gains of northern Iraqi Kurds seem to
have emboldened the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum
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republic,” whereby Turks and Kurds would constitute the “two founding communi-
ties.” Given such developments, the EU-led liberal democratic reforms created anxi-
ety at home. Despite the growing European and US demands that Turkey define
Kurds as a minority group entitled to positive discrimination Turkish consensus
holds that the resolution of the Kurdish problem would be possible by way of




Second, Turkey’s frustration with the Europeanization process has grown
because the European Union has not kept its promise of easing trade restrictions on
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus following the latter’s overwhelming




 Rather than keeping its promise to
Turkish Cypriots the EU partially suspended accession negotiations with Turkey in
December 2006 over eight specific chapters on the grounds that Turkey did not
open its sea and airports to the Greek Cypriot naval vessels and airplanes. Greek
Cypriots did not support the Annan Plan yet they were admitted to the EU as full
members. The fact that the Greek Cypriots could easily manipulate the institutional
mechanisms of the EU against Turkey has been perceived by Ankara as an example
of the growing EU reluctance to accept Turkey.
Third, while the EU emphasized Turkey’s deficiencies in the field of human
rights and minorities it did not put equal stress on its secular character. This fact has
caused some in Ankara to ask if the EU’s behind-the-curtain intention was to help
Turkey transform into an Islamizing country so that the question of Turkey’s suit-
ability for membership would drop off the agenda once and for all. This possible
intention reminded many Turks of the European powers’ approach towards the




Fourth, a growing number of Europeans now loudly argue that non-membership
alternatives should be offered to Turkey. For example, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel suggests Turkey’s attachment to the EU through the formation of a privi-
leged partnership. During the November 2007 congress of the Christian Democratic
Party in Germany the suggestion to offer Turkey a privileged partnership status was
written into the official party documents. Similarly, French President Nicolas
Sarkozy claimed that Turkey should be included in a French-led Mediterranean




 In the same vein, the Turkish public has grown unhappy
with the emergence of the idea that the EU’s absorption capacity should be one of





 This feeling helped legitimize the view that the EU is now discriminating
against Turkey; in the past, the EU has never adopted such a criterion with respect to
other candidate states.
Fifth, the decision of the French parliament to criminalize people who deny the
so-called “Armenian genocide” has further exacerbated Turkey’s frustration. Both
the Kemalist secular elites and the AKP government are strongly against the idea






Sixth, a particular development that has contributed to the erosion of the AKP’s
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ruled in favor of the decisions of the Turkish courts to ban the wearing of turbans in
universities. Initially, the AKP supported those who appealed to this court with
regard to the banning of headscarves in Turkish universities. The assumption on the
part of AKP was that the ECHR would rule against the decisions of the Turkish
courts.
The logic of interest adopted in the formulation of Turkey’s foreign policy
towards the United States has also experienced setbacks for various reasons, of
which the diverging Turkish and US understandings of the end result of the liberal-
democratic transformation process in the Middle East comes first. Turkey simply
fears that in the absence of internal dynamics, immediate democratization attempts
in the region would result in chaos and anarchy, if not in the eventual dismember-
ment of current regimes. From Ankara’s perspective, an externally oriented democ-
ratization attempt would likely bring into power radical Islamists or ethnic










the United States have also disagreed on to how to shape Iraq’s internal order and its




 In Turkey’s view, the post-Saddam era of
Iraq should not be based on a weak federal arrangement in which the prospects of
independent Kurdish rule in the north remain strong. The command of the center
over the whole country should be guaranteed, even if Iraq’s division into separate
sovereign states appears to some Americans as a viable strategy. From Ankara’s
perspective, the US government should support Turkey’s military struggle against
PKK presence in northern Iraq, even if it risks the functional cooperation between
Washington and Erbil. Suggestions by the United States that Turkey should, above
all, find an internal solution to the PKK terrorism and engage in a diplomatic rela-
tionship with the representatives of the Kurdish Regional Government have not
been perceived positively in Ankara. Ankara has long expected that Washington put





 After months, if not years, of painstaking negotiations on all fronts, the
Turks and the Americans have developed a common understanding, particularly on
the need to eradicate the PKK from northern Iraq, a situation that constituted the
biggest roadblock to cooperation among Turks, Kurds, and Americans.
Ankara and Washington have also been at odds with respect to the optimal strat-
egy towards Iran. While Ankara has long supported the EU-led constructive engage-
ment approach and argued for Iran’s gradual reintegration into global society, the
United States has simply defined Iran as an existential threat that needs to be
contained at all costs. From Ankara’s point of view a nightmare scenario would
occur if the United States government asked Ankara to downgrade its improving
economic relations with Tehran, if not to side with Washington in a military
campaign against the regime. Seen from this angle it is no surprise that US objec-




Another point of disagreement between Turkey and the United States concerns
Syria. While US administrations have long defined Syria as a terrorist and “rogue
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means, Turkey has developed the view that peace in the Middle East requires the
active participation of the Syrian regime in the process. Turkey does not want to see
its improving relations with Syria—mainly owing to Syria’s giving in to Turkish
pressure to expel the head of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, from its territories—damaged
by the growing tension between Washington and Damascus.
Moreover, while the AKP government has recognized the results of the elections
held in the Palestinian Territories in early 2006, the US administration has declined
to recognize Hamas, which was victorious in the elections, as the legitimate repre-
sentative of the Palestinian people. In the eyes of the Americans, Hamas is only a
terrorist organization. Turkey has also been at odds with the United States whenever
the Turkish governments have harshly criticized the level of violence inflicted upon
the Palestinian people by Israeli security forces.
The view that Turkey’s improving relations with Russia might be impaired by the
growing tension between the West and Russia offers another justification for the
erosion of the logic of interest towards the West. Turkey does not want to view Russia
simply through the glasses of the West. Regional antipathy towards the West has
recently helped Turkey and Russia to come closer. Russia, under Putin’s presidency
from May 2000 to May 2008, followed a Eurasianist foreign policy, the ultimate goal
of which is to reclaim Russia’s loss of power and prestige in international politics.
Russia has grown skeptical of Western policies in the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and
the Middle Eastern regions. Feelings of encirclement and isolation have formed in
Moscow. In its drive to free itself of such Western policies, Russia has approached
Turkey as a potential ally. Both countries believe that the West treats them instrumen-
tally; both feel frustrated by Western attempts to contain and isolate them. Both view




 Both are discontent with growing
US efforts to reach out to the Black Sea region as the dominant security player. Unlike
their relations with Western statesmen, Russian and Turkish statesmen treat each
other with respect. Turkey is now dependent on Russian natural gas. The trade volume
between the two countries currently amounts to US$20 billion. Russian tourists have
outpaced Germans in visiting Turkey. Some analysts even argue that Russia has




The Turkish military has even put former Russian president Putin’s speech, delivered
at the Munich Security conference in February 2007, on its official website. In that
speech, Putin harshly criticized the unilateral and coercive US foreign policies in the
post-September 11 era and put the main blame for growing global instability and
chaos on Washington’s policies.
In addition, there are now some influential circles inside Turkey, most notably
some retired generals, who argue that Turkey should leave NATO and try to form
strategic security relationships with Russia, China, and Iran, most probably within




 To them, NATO has
lost its Cold-War era strategic rationale, and Turkey and the United States have
adopted diametrically opposing views on as many issues as possible. Turkey’s abil-
ity to develop closer relations with the geopolitical powers of Eurasia, namely
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transformation because this transformation is based on the idea that these countries





This study has mainly argued that the decades-long ideational logic towards the EU
and NATO is gradually losing its legitimacy in Turkey as the changing dynamics of
Turkey’s relations with the West no longer guarantee Turkey’s Western/European
identity. The latest trends suggest that the West now sees Turkey more as part of the
Greater Middle Eastern region than part of Europe. Combined with the growing
legitimacy of Eurasian identity at home, the West’s approach towards Turkey has
gradually led Turkish foreign policy-makers to adopt a logic of interest towards the
West. Public opinion polls by the German Marshall Fund carried out between 2005
and 2009 almost steadily reveal that even Turkey’s instrumental cooperation with




 Turks were also found to be the most pessi-
mistic regarding the prospects of Turkey’s accession to the EU.
What Turkey is now experiencing in its relations with the leading members of the
Western world, namely the EU and the United States, is quite extraordinary. On the
one hand, Turkey has come closer to the EU in an institutional sense; on the other
hand, a growing number of Turkish people question the EU’s true intentions behind
the accession process. Similarly, while Turkey is trying to improve its tarnished
relations with the United States in the post-Iraq War era, strong reservations are
surfacing regarding the true intentions of the United States in the region.
With these changes in mind many Turks are asking the following questions: Does
the accession process reflect a rational logic in the sense that the EU would admit
Turkey once the accession criteria are fulfilled? Is the sole purpose for placing
Turkey in the accession process to exert a dominating influence on Turkey’s behav-
iors? Does the United States want to see a divided Iraq, with its north ruled by an
independent Kurdish government? These are legitimate questions that many Turks
have on their minds. What is potentially worrying is that if no satisfactory answers
are found in a reasonable time period, a significant majority of Turkish people may
interpret the decades-long Westernization and/or Europeanization process as




1. Most authors use the term “war of independence” to define the period of a series of Turkish military
campaigns against occupying powers from 1920 to 1922. It is possible for there to be no difference
between a “war of liberation” and a “war of independence” as long as both lead the way to the liber-
ation of a territory from foreign occupation. Yet “war of independence” is a more suitable term for
people fighting for their freedom against colonial powers who have ruled for extended periods. In the
case of the Turkish War of Liberation one must bear in mind that the Turks, who built empires (the
Seljuks, the Ottomans), have never been colonized or ruled by outside powers. One exception is a



































of the surrender of the defeated Ottoman Sultan at the end of the World War I. His decision was by
no means accepted by the Ottoman military officer of the time, Mustafa Kemal, and his like-minded
comrades and followers, who launched a national resistance movement at first and then an all-out
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